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Tech Interview Prep
Technical interview guide

Multi-Factor Authentication Design

Combining independent authentication factors, and why some MFA methods are meaningfully stronger than others.

Read
45 min
Practice MCQs
25
Interview Q&A
25
Edition
v5
Editorial status
Reviewed

Scope: NIST SP 800-63B-4, WebAuthn Level 3, FIDO passkey guidance, TOTP/HOTP, CISA, and OWASP guidance current 2026-09-04.

Curated: · Written: · Reviewed:

25 questions

MCQ-6A relying party's registration endpoint receives a credential creation response. The stored session challenge matches clientDataJSON.challenge byte-for-byte, clientDataJSON.origin matches the RP's origin, and the RP ID hash in the authenticator data matches the RP ID. But clientDataJSON.type is "webauthn.get". What should the endpoint do?
MCQ-2An attacker runs a reverse proxy at evil.example that mirrors the real RP's login page and relays every request, holding a valid TLS certificate for evil.example. Users who register and sign in through it are still safe on the real site. What property of the ceremony stops the attacker?
MCQ-1A red-team exercise stands up a proxy that serves a copy of the sign-in page, forwards everything the user types or confirms to the real service inside the same session, and ends the run holding the user's authenticated session. Which sign-in combination would that proxy have been unable to complete?
MCQ-3After a phishing incident in which an attacker logged in with a valid TOTP code seconds after the victim typed it, a team drops TOTP for WebAuthn. Which property of TOTP explains why the relayed code was accepted?
MCQ-5A bank sets userVerification: 'required' for transfers over $10,000 and stores each passkey's credential ID and public key. A review finds that a passkey registered on a phone whose owner had disabled biometrics, the user taps the screen to approve, still completes a $25,000 transfer. The server already verifies the signature, the rpIdHash and the challenge. Which check is missing?
MCQ-8A relying party's admin flow accepts only device-bound credentials. During registration it parses the WebAuthn authenticator data and reads BE=1, BS=0. What should it do with this credential?
MCQ-7A relying party stores the last signature counter it saw for each credential. Two credentials are registered to one user: - Credential A, a hardware security key: counters 41, 42, 43, 44 on its last four logins. - Credential B, a synced passkey: counter 0 on all four of its logins. The next two logins present A with counter 41 and B with counter 0. Both assertions verify. Which reading is correct?
MCQ-4A company requires FIDO2 for its 60 privileged admins. 45 use hardware security keys; 15 use the IdP vendor's cloud-synced passkey, which lives in the vendor's vault and is unlocked by the admin's account password plus an SMS code. Over six weeks the SOC sees three privileged logins from a new ASN at 03:00. The IdP logs show each login carried a valid WebAuthn assertion from a registered credential, and the three admins say they were asleep with their phones on the nightstand. Which explanation fits the evidence?
MCQ-16A service verifies TOTP codes for 4 million accounts. Each seed is 20 bytes and was stored in plaintext, so a database dump would let an attacker mint valid codes for every account indefinitely. A migration replaced each stored seed with `bcrypt(seed, cost=12)`, and the verification path now reads that column. After deploy, every login fails with 'invalid code', including logins where the user's submitted code is correct. What is the cause?
MCQ-17An authentication service validates RFC 6238 TOTP codes (6 digits, 30-second step) against the current server step only, with 5 attempts allowed per account per 15 minutes (20 per hour). Of roughly 40,000 logins a day, 1.8% of first attempts fail, and support has traced the failures to phones whose clocks sit 15 to 25 seconds off UTC, some fast and some slow: a phone that far off generates the code for its own step, which disagrees with the server's step for that many seconds out of every 30, so it fails most logins. A support campaign asking those users to re-sync their phone clocks changed the failure rate by nothing measurable. The team will make one change; it must stop any code from validating twice, and expected successful random guesses must stay under 1 per account-year at the maximum attempt rate. Which change should it make?
MCQ-19A login service verifies a 6-digit TOTP after the password. Last week's logs show 40,000 source IPs, each sending 3 attempts per hour, all against the same 2,000 accounts. The per-IP limit of 10 attempts/minute never fired, and 14 accounts were compromised. Which change should ship?
MCQ-18A B2B SaaS company enforces MFA with push approval. The authenticator shows only 'Approve sign-in?' and nothing else. Over 36 hours, 14 employees received between 25 and 70 prompts each, and four tapped Approve. Each of those four approvals was followed within two minutes by a session from an IP in an ASN the employee had never used. Every prompt came from one of three addresses in a single /24, and the attacker has changed source addresses twice during the campaign. The attacker signed in with passwords from a 2019 breach dump. The team wants a change that holds even if the attacker obtains valid passwords again. Which single change removes the mechanism that turned an unsolicited prompt into a session?
MCQ-23An IdP's logs show seven push-MFA prompts sent to a staff engineer's phone between 02:11 and 02:16 from ASN 9009, a hosting provider the company does not use. The engineer denies all seven. The same ASN shows one successful push approval at 02:09 that the engineer says was not them. The IdP locks an account for 30 minutes after five denials in ten minutes. What should the on-call engineer do first?
MCQ-25A 4,000-employee company's quarterly review reports 98% MFA enrollment (3,920 accounts on push). The same quarter shows 1,180 accounts with a security key or passkey registered, 610 helpdesk MFA resets, and 12 account takeovers: 9 from repeated push approvals the victim eventually accepted, 3 from a helpdesk reset after a phone call. Which reading of the data is correct?
MCQ-20A helpdesk resets MFA after an agent matches three profile fields: name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the SSN. Over 90 days the desk handled 4,800 resets and 31 account takeovers, and every takeover caller passed the three-field check using data from a public breach dump. In 26 of the 31 the attacker also controlled the account's mailbox; 21 of those 26 also controlled the recovery phone. In the other 5 the attacker controlled neither the mailbox nor the phone. The team changes the flow: on a match, the agent no longer reads the new secret to the caller; the system emails a one-time reset link to the account's mailbox address on file and holds it 24 hours before it activates. How many of the 31 takeovers does this change prevent?
MCQ-10A B2B SaaS vendor's support desk removes MFA for a caller who answers three profile questions: account creation date, last four of the card on file, and billing ZIP. A 2023 breach dump of a partner site carried the full billing profile, those three answers plus the rest of the profile fields, for 40,000 of the vendor's accounts. An attacker used them to clear the check: the first agent refused, the second approved, and the factor came off. The post-reset alert reached the security team 40 minutes later, after the attacker had already changed the recovery email. Which change closes the path the attacker used?
MCQ-11A service issues each user ten recovery codes, each an 8-digit decimal number, and stores them as unsalted SHA-256 hashes in the users table. A read-only replica of that table leaks. A single GPU tests 10^9 SHA-256 hashes per second. Which conclusion about the leaked codes is correct?
MCQ-12A service issues 10 single-use recovery codes at MFA enrollment and offers nothing else besides the TOTP app on the user's phone. Six months of telemetry: 22% of users who filed a lost-device ticket had already consumed all 10 codes, and 61% of the consumed codes were spent logging in from a new device the user still held. Support-override tickets run 1,100/month with a 0.9% confirmed-takeover rate. Which change most directly removes the pressure behind both numbers?
MCQ-9An identity provider binds a new authenticator when the request carries a valid session cookie and the user re-enters their account password. Sessions last 30 days, and the password is the only factor at login. An attacker stole a session cookie on day 1 and already has the password from an unrelated 2023 breach. On day 5 the attacker calls the binding endpoint with the password and a new passkey. The IdP emails the account address after the binding completes; the user does not act on it. What is the account's state on day 6?
MCQ-15An admin console issues a signed session cookie after a TOTP challenge. The cookie has a 12-hour absolute lifetime, is not bound to the client's IP or user agent, and the app keeps no server-side session table and exposes no revocation endpoint. At 09:00 an admin completes MFA and receives a cookie. At 09:20 an attacker exfiltrates that cookie through an XSS in a third-party analytics script and replays it from a different host. The admin never signs out and notices nothing. How long does the attacker's access last?
MCQ-14A service issues a step-up token after a successful WebAuthn ceremony. The token is a signed JWT with claims sub (account id), sid (session id), act (the action type the user approved), exp (issued time + 300 s), and jti (a unique id). The verifier accepts a sensitive request only when the signature verifies, sub equals the account of the current session, sid equals the current session id, act equals the action type in the request, and the current time is before exp. The verifier does not store or check jti. Alice, session sid=A1, completes a ceremony at 10:00:00 for act=payout.update; her token is J9 with exp=10:05:00. Bob, session sid=B1, completes a ceremony at 10:00:00 for act=payout.update; his token is J8 with exp=10:05:00. Which request does the verifier accept?
MCQ-13A payments console is gated by a policy that requires phishing-resistant MFA (WebAuthn) on every session. A user on a managed corporate laptop signs in with password + TOTP; the risk engine scores the session 8/100 and marks the device as known. The user then opens the payments console. What should the gateway do?
MCQ-22A user's authenticator inventory shows a fifth credential created 2024-02-09 at 02:41 UTC, last used 2024-02-09 at 02:41 UTC, backup eligible = false, AAGUID unknown. The user revokes it at 02:50 UTC. The attacker, who registered the credential, still holds a session cookie issued at 02:40 UTC. What does the revocation accomplish?
MCQ-21A hospital portal signs clinicians in with a password, then a push prompt they must dismiss by swiping a slider across the phone screen within 20 seconds. In a pilot, 22 of 30 clinicians who use switch control or voice control could not complete the swipe, and the only fallback is three security questions. The fix must ship in the next release without re-enrolling any of the 4,000 staff, keep AAL2-equivalent assurance, and meet WCAG 2.2 AA. Which change meets all three?
MCQ-24An organization relies on an external identity provider (IdP) for centralized phishing-resistant MFA. During an upstream IdP outage, administrators must retain emergency tenant access without introducing a single point of failure or an unmonitored backdoor. Which break-glass architecture satisfies these requirements?